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The following summarising paragraph contains a few terms not defined until later: 
Given any consistent formal system containing arithmetic, a man who has understood Gödel’s 
construction can write down a true theorem G expressible in the system but unprovable in it. 
(The man will believe G if he believes the system is consistent.) A machine program that 
represents the formal system will never print G, even if the program contains a randomising 
device enabling it to apply the rules of inference in an arbitrary order. It has been argued that 
this shows that a man, qua mathematician, transcends a machine in at least one respect. (The 
argument does not depend on whether machines are capable of belief, nor on whether they 
could act as if they were so capable. I think they could act (1) so but the reader need not worry 
about this point since the present note is concerned with logic, not with probability.) This point 
of view is essentially refuted by the observation that Gödel’s construction could itself be 
carried out by another (deterministic) machine. But further Gödel propositions can then be 
appended and a complete treatment leads inevitably to questions concerning the formalisation 
of transfinite counting, which incidentally preceded Gödel’s construction historically by 
several decades. If the mentalists still wish to make a case they must base it on transfinite 
counting rather than on Gödel’s theorem. It is entertaining to note that transfinite counting can 
be vividly expressed in polytheological terms. So much by way of introduction. 
Lucas (2) argued that ‘Gödel’s theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, 
that minds cannot be explained as machines’. Feeling that mathematical results can sometimes 
be proved by metaphysical arguments, but not conversely, I argued (3) that there must be some 
loophole in Lucas’s thesis. But my discussion itself contained an error so I am anxious to argue 
the case again with greater accuracy. This accuracy is bought at the cost of an increase in 
technicality, but I believe the arguments will be intelligible at least to all philosophers of 
science. 
Given any computer program (formal system) for proving theorems in arithmetic, Gödel’s 
construction (4) enables us to print new theorems which the original program would not print, 
and the new theorems are true if ordinary arithmetic is consistent. Let us express that more 
carefully. 
A (finitely based) formal system is defined in the following manner. We are given a finite 
alphabet of symbols, and a finite set A of finite strings of these symbols, each string being 
called an axiom. Axioms are regarded as a special case of theorems. We are also given a finite 
set R of rules of inference which can operate on some finite sequences of theorems, each such 
operation produces a new theorem (again a finite string of symbols) and this theorem is then 
said to be proved. We call this the formal system F = (R, A). 
Corresponding to any such system, a computer program can be written which will print in turn 
each theorem of the system. The number of theorems is usually infinite, but each theorem (if 
provable) will ultimately be proved (printed). 
The Gödel construction C can be applied to any finitely based formal system F, provided that 
ordinary arithmetic is represented in the system, and will yield a new ‘theorem’ or 
‘proposition’ (string of symbols) G, called a Gödel proposition. This proposition will denote an 
arithmetical statement that is true in the formal system F, but is unprovable provided that F is 
consistent. (In an inconsistent system every proposition is provable including the ‘false’ ones 
such as 0 = I.) Moreover, if a system F 1  is consistent, its Gödel proposition G1  can be 
appended to its set A1  of axioms, and the new system F 2  will still be consistent. 
In order to avoid a proliferation of notation, let us denote by F a program that prints the 
theorems that the system F can prove. Now the Gödel construction C can itself be expressed as 
a program, which we also denote by C. When C operates on the program F 1 , it produces a 
program F 2 , this being a representation of the formal system F 2 . Since the program F1  is itself 
a string of symbols we begin to regard the program C as itself a formal system, but since it can 
be applied to every program of the form (R, A) it might be very difficult to show that it is 
finitely based.  
The new formal system F 2  satisfies the requirements for the application of Gödel’s 
construction. This will give rise to a new Gödel proposition G 2  and a new formal system F 3  
and so on. 
We can imagine a human operator playing a game of one-upmanship against a programmed 
computer. If the program is F n , the human operator can print the theorem G n , which the 
programmed computer, or, if you prefer, the program, would never print, if it is consistent. 
This is true for each whole number n, but the victory is a hollow one since a second computer, 
loaded with the program C, could put the human operator out of job. And even the original 
computer, suitably programmed, would be able to print in turn each of the Gödel propositions 
G1 , G 2 , G 3 , … , by repeatedly applying the operator C. By means of a process known to 
logicians as triangularisation, this program could be modified to print each of the theorems of 
the infinite sequence of formal systems F1 , F 2 , F 3  … It is natural to denote this program by 
Fω , where ω  is the first transfinite ordinal. In spite of appearances, Fω  could be written in 
finite terms and correspond to a finitely based formal system (Rω , A) where A is the same 
finite set of axioms that we started with, that is, the axioms of the system F, and Rω is R plus a 
finite number of extra rules. 
The notion of transfinite ordinals can be thought of in terms of polytheism. We imagine that, 
for each integer n, ZEUS 1+n  made ZEUS n , where ZEUSω  made ZEUS n  for all n. Who made 
ZEUSω ? Answer: ZEUS 1+ω , and the suffixes can be continued indefinitely, thus: I, 2, 3, … , 
ω , ω +1, ω +2, … , 2ω , 2ω +1, … 3ω , … , ω 2 , … , ω 3 , ..., ω ω , … , ω ωω , …. 
Similarly, the Gödel construction C can be applied to Fω , giving F 1+ω , and we can proceed to 
higher and higher systems, just as in the process of transfinite counting, sometimes adding I, 
and sometimes applying a generalisation of triangularisation. 
In order to write a program that can carry out this construction as far as any specifiable ordinal, 
it will be necessary at least to invent a representation for this, and for all smaller ordinals, on 
the integers. There is a known complete process for doing this, and the process of transfinite 
counting is thus naturally described as ‘creative’. The use of this term is not evidence that the 
process cannot be formalised, and I believe that a sufficiently well-written program would be 
able to go as far in transfinite counting as any man can ever go. It is useless for the ‘mentalist’ 
to argue that any given program can always be improved, since the process for improving 
programs can presumably be programmed also; certainly this can be done if the mentalist 
describes how the improvement is to be made. If he does not give such a description, then ha 
has not made a case. 
A similar controversy applies in a wider context: the only reason I know to suppose that the 
creative intellectual process of man cannot be mechanised is the weak one that it has not yet 
been done. I am of course here ignoring such practicalities as cost. 
If the controversial ‘axiom of choice’ is true, then there is a smallest unconstructible transfinite 
ordinal τ . The question of its ‘existence’ is somewhat controversial, but of course it cannot be 
reached by any transfinite counting program. The controversy is bound up with what is meant 
by mathematical existence. ZEUS τ  should have a prominent place in any polytheology. 
Some readers will have asked themselves what meaning it can have to say that a proposition, 
expressible in a formal system, is ‘true’ if it is not provable. One answer is that a proposition P, 
of finite length, can express an infinite number of provable propositions, and yet perhaps not 
itself be provable, since a proof, by definition, must be finite. (5) An example of a proposition 
that might be of this form is ‘For all positive integers, r, s, t, and n, we have r 2+n +s 2+n ≠ t 2+n ’. 
This is of course the famous unproved ‘Fermat’s Last Theorem’. Like Riemann’s hypothesis 
concerning the zeros of the zeta function, this ‘theorem’ might be true but unprovable but if 
false it is provably so. 
An error in my New Scientist article, which was pointed out by Alan L. Tritter (who has also 
made many other useful suggestions), was in the assumption that the finiteness of the internal 
storage of a computer (or man) would prevent it (or Him) from attaining some constructible 
infinite ordinals. The limitation cannot be in the finiteness of the internal storage, since it has 
been proved (6) that a universal computer (Turing machine) needs no more than one binary 
digit of internal storage (when its input-output tape is of unbounded extent, and the tape 
alphabet large enough). Of course such a computer would be intolerably slow, but that is 
beside the point. 
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